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Open any medieval textbook and you will find that the fourteenth century is referred to as
a period of ‘crisis.’ In England specifically, it opened with the invasion of Scotland in 1303
which sparked fighting between the two countries for several decades. Then there were climatic
changes, ushering in what is known as the “Little Ice Age” and causing the Great Famine of
1315-1317. A bovine plague in 1319 exacerbated the impacts of the famine on the population.1
Within twenty years of that disaster, fighting between France and England began in 1337 – the
start of a war that would last over one hundred years and run through the reign of five English
kings.2 To make matters worse, just eleven years into the war, the Black Death swept through
Europe killing at least a third of the population.3 These are only some of the problems from just
the first half of a chaotic century.
Being a peasant in medieval England was no easy task at the best of times, let alone in
the fourteenth century between the famines, diseases, and wars. Throughout the thirteenth
century there had been population growth, increased agricultural output, the development of
widespread market networks, and the rise in the number of people dependent on the market for
food.4 It was a booming time. All of this expansion did not survive the chaos of the early
fourteenth century because, as Barbara F. Harvey notes, in the decades prior to the arrival of the
Black Death, the “expansive economic trends of the earlier Middle Ages were first halted and
then put into reverse.”5 Population growth stalled and started to decrease with the Great Famine;
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laborers’ wages were low; prices were high.6 All this combined to make life pretty bleak for the
average peasants before the arrival of the Black Death.
The arrival of the plague only made life more difficult for the peasants. According to
John of Reading, a monk of Westminster, “ulcers broke out in the groin and armpit, which
tortured the dying for three days.”7 Which, as the chronicler Robert of Avesbury notes,
“remov[ed] them from human concerns in the course of a morning.”8 While we know now that
the Black Death killed somewhere between a third and a half of the population,9 people in the
fourteenth century, surrounded by all the death at the time, were terrified and some, such as the
chronicler, Ralph Higden, estimated “that scarcely a tenth of mankind was left alive” by the time
the plague ended.10 Thus, by the middle of the fourteenth century, on top of the stresses brought
on by the stagnating economy, English peasants were worried about dying, their family and
friends dying, and what life they would have after the disease ended. They had no idea if they
would survive the pandemic or what would be left of the world if they did.
If they survived the plague, however, peasants were actually presented with more
opportunities. Land availability increased after the Black Death, allowing peasants to rent and
cultivate larger plots. Laborers were in high demand and that gave them the power to negotiate
for better terms and higher wages. After the difficulties of trying to live with a declining
economy and surviving the plague, life seemed to be getting better. But that was not to be. The
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expected impacts of the Black Death, such as increasing wages, decreasing prices, improved
standards of living, and increased personal freedoms, did not play out in the anticipated ways.
Instead, wages rose for a short period of time after the plague before stagnating; prices rose and
continued to rise for decades; standards of living only slightly improved; and, peasants continued
to be repressed. Why did the post-Black Death economy behave contrary to what we might
expect? Why did life not dramatically improve for the survivors?
In order to answer these questions, we need to look beyond the peasants and economic
theories to another key actor of the time: the Crown. Edward III, king of England since 1327, and
his ministers could not allow the economy to function on its own. With no concept of laissezfaire, they meddled with prices and wages, interfering with the natural ramifications of the mass
mortality caused by the Black Death. What drove them to these actions? Above all, it was about
maintaining the status quo, a system that the elites of society had created to insure their position
in society. The king meddled with the economy by introducing new regulations in order to
appease the elites, who faced financial and social losses after the plague. He did this because in
the established social order he depended on the support of the aristocracy to govern as he
pleased. Edward III had specific policy priorities in the mid-fourteenth century, such as
controlling the economy and fighting France in the Hundred Year’s War, which he could not
undertake without the backing of England’s elites. Therefore, Edward III repressed the peasantry
through economic regulations, preventing them from improving their standards of living through
social mobility, to maintain the status quo, so that the upper echelons of society would continue
to support him.

3

Interpreting the Impacts on the Medieval Economy
In order to fully understand the significance of Edward III’s actions in the wake of the
Black Death, we need to explore a key debate about the impacts that the crisis of the fourteenth
century had on the medieval economy. Peasant life was difficult throughout the Middle Ages
because social, political, and economic structures constrained them. When it comes to studying
the crisis of the fourteenth century, scholars have debated what aspects of the economy explain
the peasants’ hardships.
This key debate was launched by the world-renowned economic historian M. M. Postan.
In the mid-twentieth century, Postan postulated that demographics were the driving force behind
economic and social changes in late medieval England. He argued that changes in the population
were decidedly connected to the trends in land production and standards of living for the
peasants. The expanding economy of the thirteenth century was, therefore, driven by an
expanding population. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, however, that increased
population led to acute land hunger throughout England, because, as Postan argues, all the viable
land had been colonized and there was no more room to expand onto. Agricultural production
reached a peak and then began to decline because the land was overworked, and an insufficient
amount of manure was available to replenish the soil’s nutrients. As England was a primarily
agrarian society, land production was a determining factor for the health of the economy.
Difficulties in agriculture would, therefore, lead to difficulties in the rest of the economy. The
large population, according to Postan, not only caused decline in agricultural production, but also
kept wages down and prices high up until the Black Death. The combined effects of a large
population and diminishing agriculture led to a full-blown Malthusian crisis, which occurs when
population growth surpasses agricultural production and the population is faced with mass
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starvation. Postan then argues that the mass mortalities in the fourteenth century led to an
improvement in conditions because wages rose and prices, specifically those of land, fell. For
Postan, all of these changes hinged on changing demographics.11 By this logic, to understand the
economy after the Black Death, we must first and foremost consider the large change in
demographics that occurred because of the mass mortality.
Since Postan’s writing, many scholars have added to the debate over the key economic
factor influencing medieval peasant life, often disagreeing with Postan on some part of his
theory. For example, Richard Britnell, in a conference presentation in 2002, saw Postan’s thesis
as a case of overreaching and oversimplification. He disputed Postan’s claims on the basis that
Postan extrapolated the data he used too far for it to be viable. This specifically weakens the
claim that declining agriculture productivity led to a decreasing population. Because of this,
Britnell viewed Postan’s thesis as questionable because it hinged solely upon the connection
between land productivity and population. In order for Postan’s thesis to survive, Britnell
contended that it needs to be modified to take other factors into consideration and abandon the
rigidity of the Malthusian model.12 When it comes to explaining the post-Black Death economy,
no single explanation is quintessential because there were various interacting components, such
as demographics, the market system, monetary factors, and government policies.
In the same vein as Britnell’s critique, scholars like Phillipp Schofield and John Munro
also presented at the 2002 conference in Montreal, offering further elements to help complicate
the debate concerning peasant life and their place in the medieval economy. Schofield criticized
Postan’s thesis for not incorporating the view that medieval peasants were market oriented. He
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argued that low-level trade and the commercial economy were tied to demographics more than
Postan admitted. Schofield thought that Postan’s thesis could be altered to include this view.13
The peasants had their own place in the economy which both affected and was affected by the
major structures in society. This means that in the aftermath of the Black Death, the changes in
the peasantry would impact the entire economy, which would then subsequently impact the
peasantry.
Munro, similarly, looked at an aspect of the economy that Postan left out of his thesis:
monetary factors. Postan’s thesis assumed that “all prices had to move together in unison during
periods of inflation and deflation,” which was definitely not true.14 Munro used statistical data of
prices and wages in the late Middle Ages to prove that they did not behave according to Postan’s
thesis. Unlike Schofield, Munro did not think that Postan’s thesis could be modified and rejected
it outright for excluding numerous important components of the medieval economy.15 The
behavior of prices and wages in the fourteenth century cannot be explained by just changes in
demographics as Postan would have it. In studying the post-Black Death economy, a variety of
economic aspects must be analyzed to construct a comprehensive description.
Each of these scholars problematized Postan’s thesis and how it explains the state of the
peasantry and its economic status. Britnell recognized that there are more factors than just
demographics that need to be considered; Schofield recommended the inclusion of the market
economy; and Munro argued that any explanation needs to incorporate monetary factors. In this
paper, I too argue that Postan’s thesis does not consider all the necessary elements. But, where
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Britnell, Schofield, and Munro focus exclusively on economics, I look at the role of the Crown.
When we think about our economy, we understand that there are rules and regulations and that
those come from the government. And yet, in the discussion of Postan and his critics the English
royal government is missing from our explanations. Based on Postan’s thesis, we expect to see
increased wages, lower prices, an improvement in the peasants’ standards of living, and
increased freedom for peasants after the Black Death. Instead, we see stagnating wages, higher
prices, only slight improvements in standards of living, and a peasantry that continued to be
repressed. The explanation for this difference lies in the Crown’s policies after the Black Death.
Some scholars, such as Buchanan Sharp, W.B. Ormrod, and Robert C. Palmer, have engaged
with the role of governmental regulation in medieval England. Sharp, specifically, looks at how
the king reacted in times of scarcity;16 Ormrod investigates the connections between royal
politics and the aftermath of the plague;17 and, Palmer analyzes the changes in English law in the
wake of the Black Death.18 However, there is still a disconnect between medieval economics and
medieval government regulation in studies of the peasantry. In this paper, I bridge the gap
between economic history on the one hand and politico-legal history on the other, examining the
economic effects of the Black Death in medieval England and how they interfaced with royal
policy to impact the peasantry. In doing this, I show that the Crown was not only a major actor in
the medieval economy, but, arguably, the most important actor. When the king meddled in the
post-Black Death economy by regulating prices and wages, he prevented the natural economic
ramifications of the plague from taking place. In doing so, he continued the institutional
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repression of the peasantry, denying them the opportunity to improve their standards of living
that presented itself in the immediate aftermath of the plague.

The Spread of the Plague
The Black Death originated in the Caucasus region in 1346 where it began to ravage the
population. As people and goods moved west along trade routes, they brought with them the
bacterium Yersinia pestis; Gabriele de’ Mussis, from Piancenza, Italy, noted that “it was as if
they had brought evil spirits with them: every city, every settlement, every place was poisoned
by the contagious pestilence, and their inhabitants, both men and women, died suddenly.”19 By
1348, the plague was working its way across Continental Europe. Geoffrey le Baker, a clerk of
Swinbrook in Oxfordshire, explains that “at last fierce destruction came to the countries beyond
the Alps, and from there, in stages to western France and Germany, and in the seventh year since
its beginning, to England.”20 Finally in the summer of 1348 our sources report its arrival in
England through the port at Melcombe in the southern county of Dorset. The Franciscans of
Lynn chronicled the arrival of the plague and noted that “two ships…landed at Melcombe in
Dorset a little before Midsummer. In them were sailors from Gascony who were infected with an
unheard of epidemic illness called pestilence.”21 From there, the plague began to spread
northward and devastate all of England, as Geoffrey le Baker recorded:
“First it virtually stripped a Dorset seaport and then its hinterland of the inhabitants, and
then it ravaged Devon and Somerset up to Bristol. As a result, the people of Gloucester
denied admission to people from Bristol, believing that the breath of those who had lived
Gabriele de’ Mussis, “The Arrival of the Plague,” in The Black Death, ed. Rosemary Horrox (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1994), 19.
20
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among the dying would be infectious. But in the end, Gloucester, and then Oxford and
London too, and finally the whole of England were so violently attacked that scarcely a
tenth of either sex survived.”22
The plague ended its devastation in England a year after it arrived in the south.23 According to
sources such as Thomas Stubbs, the chronicler for the archbishop of York in c.1373, it finally
reached the northern city of York in late May 1349 before dying out sometime in late July. 24
Because it took time for the plague to spread, towns in the north began to feel the effects
of the Black Death at least six months before it reached them. The news of the pestilence caused
the population to be fearful, and in some places, there were attempts to limit the spreading of
disease. At this time, people did not have germ theory to explain the transmission of diseases, so
they had to use what they did know to understand the plague. The first and most profound
reactions were based in religion. The earliest reaction in our sources comes from William
Zouche, Archbishop of York, on July 28, 1348, when he ordered intercessionary processions to
be held every Wednesday and Friday in the diocese.25 Though the Black Death did not infect the
people of York until the following year, they were aware of it and began to take action that they
thought would help decrease the damage done by the plague, and even possibly stop it before it
reached them.
About a month later, King Edward III sent a request for prayers to the Archbishop of
Canterbury, “so that Almighty God, of his ineffable mercy, might save and protect the king’s
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realm of England from these plagues and mortalities.”26 The belief was that God was punishing
them for their sins. In a later letter, Edward III observed that “sinfulness and pride are constantly
increasing in the people, and charity has grown more than usually cold in them.”27 The flagrant
sinning of the people had offended God, and he would only expel the plague when he was
“pacified by the performance of penance for sin and by the prayers of the faithful.”28 It was this
belief that led to additional praying for England as a whole.
In addition to the religious explanations, people attempted to understand the plague
through scientific methods. The most prevalent theory for the cause and spread of the Black
Death was miasma, or corrupted air. This corrupted air could come from things that smelled bad
or from the infected.29 This line of thinking brought about a number of suggested methods to
prevent contracting the plague. John of Burgundy recommended “smell[ing] roses, violets, lilies,
white and red sandalwood, musk, or camphor if the weather is misty or the air quality bad.”30
And, Bengt Knutsson, following what John Jacobus wrote in c.1364, suggested that “every foul
stench is to be eschewed,” that “one should flee such person as are infected,” and that “nobody
should stand in a great press of people.”31 With recommendations such as these, communities
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restricted interaction and limited trade to the necessities to try and reduce their exposure to the
spreading plague.32 These efforts did not work to stop the pestilence.
The Black Death undoubtedly killed a devastating number of people throughout England;
however, it is difficult to know how many. The religious and pseudo-scientific explanations for
the plague caused widespread fear and uncertainty. An unthinkable number of people were
dying, and the contemporary chroniclers had to record the events to the best of their ability. The
Eulogium estimated that one-fifth of the population perished; the chronicler at the cathedral
priory of Rochester estimated one-third; Thomas Walsingham at St. Albans Abbey estimated
one-half; and the most extreme estimate came from Ralph Higden in Chester, John of Reading in
Westminster, and Geoffrey le Baker, who all said that “scarcely a tenth” of people survived.33 At
the time it was impossible for the chroniclers to know exactly how many people were dying, all
they knew was that it was a substantial number.
Modern scholars believe that the mortality rate was actually in the range of thirty to fifty
percent. While this is still a broad range, we are incapable of better estimations because the
sources range widely and there is a lot of missing data. John Hatcher, one of the foremost
historians of the Black Death, explains that most of the data on mortality primarily relates to the
clergy and not the peasantry, and that there is no reliable data on urban deaths. He notes that “a
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national death-rate below 25 per cent or above 55 per cent would appear most unlikely.”34 There
is enough evidence that the death rate was at least thirty percent, but the progress of the English
economy in subsequent years indicates that it was less than fifty percent.35 While those represent
the overall mortality rate, some locations were hit harder than others by the plague: Market
Roding in Essex, only lost only twenty-five percent of their population, while Durham Priory, on
the other hand, suffered the loss of sixty percent of its tenants. The plague hit the young and the
elderly the hardest, so most of the survivors were in their twenties and thirties; they were the
ones who confronted the new challenges and opportunities that arose in the wake of the mass
mortality.36

The Mortality’s Impacts on Agriculture
Beyond the fear and uncertainty, the mass mortality of the Black Death impacted many
sectors of society. The most profound effects were on agriculture and labor, the sectors of society
which were mainly comprised of peasants. Each of these sectors saw major changes due to the
mass mortality of the plague. In the middle of the fourteenth century, most of the population
lived and worked in agrarian areas. There were, typically, less than four-hundred people per
square mile before the pestilence;37 so, when nearly half the population died, it had a tremendous
impact on agricultural productivity. In order to understand the severity of these impacts, it is
imperative to first understand the system of agriculture of the time.
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In the Middle Ages, England had a seigneurial agriculture system. Most land was owned
by a lord, who would have a manor on that land, even if they did not always reside in it. The
clergy also held land which was managed similarly to the aristocracy’s; bishops and monasteries
were the ‘lords’ of estate land held by their institution, often managed by a secular agent.38 There
were, broadly speaking, two levels of peasants who lived and worked on the lord’s land: villeins,
or serfs, and freemen. The villeins were tied to the land and were required to pay the owner of
that land a collection of dues to be able to cultivate part of the land for themselves. The main
dues included giving a portion of their own crops to the lord and completing two to three days of
work each week on the lord’s land. In addition to these regular dues, villeins had to pay the lord
a series of situational dues, including: tribute upon death, usually consisting of the best horse or
cattle; payment when a daughter got married; payment for birth of a child; and payment for
permission to leave the manor.39 In contrast to villeins, there were the free peasants, who would
rent parcels of land from the lord. These tenants had the rights to cultivate their land and access
other resources on the lord’s land, such as timber, water sources, and use of pasture. Each tenant
would live in a house in a village on the lord’s land, while the land they rented was scattered in
narrow strips throughout the common fields. Free peasants typically paid their rent with cash and
only owed the lord a small amount of labor services, during the most labor-intensive periods of
the year, such as sowing and harvesting. Not all the land was cultivated by villeins or tenants on
it. Some of it, known as demesnes land, was held by the lords themselves, who used hired labor,
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supplemented by the service owed by tenants, especially those held in villeinage, to directly
support themselves.40
The amount of land held determined how much a peasant could produce on their own and
how much they had to look to outside sources of income. The size of tenants’ holding varied
greatly, some people had only a few acres while others had upwards of thirty acres, but most
peasant holdings before the Black Death were fifteen acres or less. A peasant’s first concern with
his crops was to feed his family. After they had enough to subsist, they would sell any remaining
produce. If they had any livestock, they could sell any products that they gained from them, such
as wool from sheep, milk from cows, or bacon from pigs. The cash earned from any agricultural
sales would first go to paying rent and fees, then to church tithes, then to any taxes levied, before
finally being used to purchase anything the family may have needed or desired. When a peasant
did not have enough land to produce enough food for his family, then they would also have to
seek additional sources of income. They would mainly find work on the lord’s demesnes as hired
labor or by completing tasks by the day for some of the wealthier peasants in their village.41
This was the agricultural system and situation of peasants in England which was
impacted by the arrival of the plague in 1348. Throughout most of the country, the Black Death
occurred in the middle of the agriculture cycle. Most people obtained the majority of their
calories from cereals, especially bread and ale, so the major crops were the various grains: wheat,
rye, barley, and mixed varieties.42 Wheat and rye were sown in the autumn after harvest and the
rest was sown in early spring. They were all then ready for harvest between August and
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September.43 The time of year that the Black Death came to a certain area determined what part
of the agriculture cycle was disrupted. For example, when the plague hit in Dorset in the summer
of 1348,44 the autumn harvest and sowing were disrupted; when it hit Cambridgeshire in early
spring of 1348-49,45 the spring sowing was disrupted. These disruptions were then amplified in
the autumn of 1349. The mortality throughout the past year meant that there were not enough
workers available at each of the important points of the agriculture cycle, nor were there enough
to regularly care for the fields and crops, resulting in less crops to be harvested. The chronicler of
Rochester cathedral priory mentioned that “[t]he shortage of labourers and of workers in every
kind of craft and occupation was then so acute that more than a third of the land throughout the
whole kingdom remained uncultivated.”46 Indeed, the situation was so distressing that Knighton
noticed “so many crops rotted in the field for want of harvesting.”47 There was less grain sown to
begin with, then those crops were not taken care of well, lowering their yields, compounding
together into a feedback loop that critically decreased the overall harvest that year and in the
following years. In fact, the harvests of 1350 and 1351 were some of the worst in the fourteenth
century.48
In addition to the crop yield being diminished, many livestock animals died during the
Black Death as well. Knighton noted in his chronicle that there was a “great murrain [an
infectious disease affecting livestock animals] of sheep throughout the realm.”49 It is unclear
whether this murrain was related to the plague or was a completely different disease that only

43

Peter Hammond, Food & Feast in Medieval England (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2005), 2–5.
“The Arrival of the Plague in Dorset,” ed. Horrox, 63.
45
John Aberth, “The Black Death in the Diocese of Ely: The Evidence of the Bishop’s Register,” Journal of
Medieval History 21, no. 3 (January 1, 1995): 280–81.
46
“The Plague Seen from Rochester,” ed. Horrox, 72.
47
Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, 1337-1396, 101.
48
David Stone, Decision-Making in Medieval Agriculture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005),
102.
49
Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, 1337-1396, 101.
44

15

affected the animals. While this disease killed many livestock animals, the greater cause of their
mortality was neglect. With so many people dying, there was no one left to look after the
animals, just as there were not enough people to care for the crops. Knighton also indicates that
“sheep and cattle wandered through the fields and amongst the crops, and there was none to seek
them, or round them up, and they perished … for want of a keeper.”50 The combined effects of
both the murrain and neglect resulted in a great diminution of the livestock population. After
grain products, meat and dairy products were the next most important aspects of the medieval
diet. The more socially important a person was, the more frequently they consumed meat.51
Dairy products, on the other hand, were consumed regularly by a larger proportion of the
population; they were used to supplement recipes and cheese was a common provision due to its
portability.52 Therefore, any changes to the livestock population also affected the supply of the
crucial foodstuffs in England. So, the decreased livestock population added to the reduced crop
yields meant that there was an overall shortage in the available food supply immediately
following the Black Death. All these changes in agriculture would have had tremendous
economic ramifications as they reverberated through society. The peasantry would bear the brunt
of these effects because they lived and worked in the agricultural sector of society.

Working in the Post-Black Death Economy
Typically, a decrease in the food supply alongside a population decline would not be seen
as distressing if they occurred proportionately. However, that was not the case with the Black
Death in England. The food supply diminished to below the level required to sustain the
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surviving population because of how much land fell out of productive use. As peasants died,
there was no one left to cultivate their land holdings; and, because they were beholden to the
owner of that land, the lord was concerned with losing income from their rents. To lessen this
loss of income, the lord seized the land and crops of deceased tenants. For example, this occurred
at the royal manor of Drakelaw in Chesire for the financial year of 1349 to 1350 for seventythree tenancies, which had held just over 215 acres, and resulted in a total loss of “£20 9s 2¼d
and half a farthing” in rent income. This was a loss of approximately forty percent of the
expected income from those rents – “£51 4s ½d.”53 Losses such as this underscored the increased
importance of tenants for landowners after the Black Death. We can see here how in the wake of
the plague there was potential for upward mobility within the peasantry because new
opportunities presented themselves. If the pestilence brought death and suffering, it could also
bring hope and opportunity.
All that land became available for new tenancies, because the lords did not have the
ability or desire to cultivate it themselves. Peasants, therefore, had the opportunity to enlarge
their holdings or take on new tenancies if they desired.54 However, most were initially unwilling
to take on new tenancies. The Bishop of Durham recorded in July of 1349 that “because of the
fear of pestilence no one wishes to make a fine [i.e. a lease] for certain land in the lord’s hand.”55
People were not confident that they were safe from the plague, especially in places such as
Durham, which is even further north than York, and faced the plague last. The mass mortality
throughout the realm also increased the risk associated with relying on the sale of crops for one’s
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livelihood: peasants were not confident that they could sell all their crops because demand was
diminished. Peasants were particularly unwilling to take on land under villeinage, because it
would have resulted in them becoming less free, and no one would be willing to do that. In order
for the lords to find tenants to work their land, they had to lease them to free tenants, often at
lower rents, because “it [was] of more use to the lord that they take it at farm than that the land
lie fallow in the lord’s hand – for, as has become apparent, there is no other alternative.”56 Now,
the peasants had an advantage that they could use to improve their lives.
Even for those peasants who were not free, the Black Death offered the potential for
social mobility. For those still held in villeinage after the Black Death, the lords had to
renegotiate the expected labor services to keep them on the land. Even though the villeins were
not, technically, allowed to leave the manor, many were able to flee during the chaos brought on
by the pestilence, and they could threaten leaving after the plague had passed because the lord
needed them more than they needed any specific lord.57 At the manor of Wood Eaton in
Oxfordshire, the weekly labor services were removed from the expected dues of the serfs;58 and,
at the manor of Aldham in Suffolk, most of the serfs were released from a third of their labor
services for three years.59
The peasants, both free and servile, were able to obtain better terms for tenancies because
they controlled the labor market after the plague. Up until the Black Death, many peasants had a
difficult time finding work because there were so many people competing for a limited number
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of low-paying jobs;60 this was a main part of the population crisis that Postan argued kept the
peasants suppressed.61 After the plague, however, there were more jobs available than there were
peasants to fill them. This labor shortage meant that the peasants now had more power in their
search for work, which they used to negotiate better terms and higher wages for themselves.
Landowners complied with the peasants’ demands because they needed their land worked.62 In
the immediate aftermath of the plague, peasants’ conditions improved as a natural consequence
of the changing economic situation after the Black Death.
The difficulty for landowners in finding laborers was compounded by the fact that
peasants were not just able to improve their situation in rural areas. They could also do so by
moving to areas that offered them more opportunities, such as the various towns and urban
centers of England. Even though most of the survivors of the Black Death were of working age,
there was still a great number of laborers who perished in the plague. Rural areas felt the brunt of
the mortality and lost many agricultural laborers; but it was not just an issue of mortality, they
also lost workers to better opportunities in urban areas. As people died in urban areas, their jobs
became available, which provided better opportunities to the survivors of the plague. Urban jobs
were typically less manually intensive and offered higher wages. In addition to better economic
opportunities, urban centers extended more personal freedoms to peasants than the countryside,
especially for those who had been held in villeinage.63 Many serfs became free by fleeing their
tenancies in the chaos caused by the plague; if they lived in an urban center for a year and a day,
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they were free.64 The Bishop of Durham noted that “William Kyd, one of the lord’s serfs, … fled
by night with his whole family.”65
Urban centers, especially the larger ones such as London, had more diverse markets with
a larger quantity and better quality of supplies.66 This would have been particularly appealing to
people when the food supply shrunk after the Black Death. Rural areas faced extreme population
loss from the combined mortality of the plague and urban flight, which dramatically impacted
agricultural production. In the immediate aftermath of the Black Death, the lives of peasants
were able to improve, as they took advantage of their new leverage and a wealth of new
opportunities. It was only a matter of time, however, before those in power began to react.
Peasants soon found that the future was not as bright as they had hoped. Before we examine the
realities of life after the Black Death for rural peasants, it may be useful to examine some of the
ways in which labor, food, and government interacted by turning our attention to the city of
London, for it was here that the Crown most readily interacted with its subjects.

London, the Plague, and Food Regulations
When the Black Death came in the mid-fourteenth century, it impacted urban centers just
as critically as it had devastated agrarian areas. Many of the economic issues that began in rural
areas because of the Black Death spread to the towns and cities. And, just as individuals had to
adjust their methods of surviving in the post-plague world, so too did large urban centers such as
London. Although urban centers offered some advantages over rural areas, they still had their
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problems to contend with. They were places of diverse work opportunities, but that did not
necessarily grant peasants any more access to power than the countryside. As in the countryside,
the social structures within towns and cities were meant to keep elites in power and peasants
oppressed. The city’s main reaction to the plague was to alter the supply routes used to provide
victuals for its inhabitants, which allowed it to maintain the market oriented economic structure
and thereby its restrictive social structures and the status quo. Within this structure, London had
to deal with a complex relationship between the city’s elites and the Crown, because each was
crucial to the survival of the other. By looking at the governance of the city we begin to see how
the Crown interacted with its subjects and intervened in their lives.
For peasants, urban life was centered around a variety of different industries in which
laborers could make their living. While the work of agrarian life was cyclical, based on the
crops, the work of urban life was steadier. Unskilled laborers in towns and cities could hope to
find work in industries ranging from domestic service in a merchant household to working as a
groom in an inn.67 In the mid-fourteenth century, a thatcher in the countryside could make
between two and three pence per day, while his helper would only make one to one and a half
pence per day.68 During that same time period, a master mason in a small town in Southeast
England could make between three and five pence per day, while his helper would only make
between one and a half and two pence per day.69 Laborers and craftsmen in London would have
earned higher wages than those in small towns, making the difference between rural and urban
incomes even more significant. Most workers, especially those who worked as servants,
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immigrating to urban centers only sought out short-term employment to take advantage of the
benefits of the opportunities there. Servants were nearly all young and unmarried and sought
work in urban centers – it offered better job security and higher wages than in the rural villages –
and remained there for only one or two years before returning home.70 Even after the Black
Death, when many positions opened up due to the mass mortality, most peasants apparently still
viewed work in towns and cities as short-term opportunities. Some, however, might have desired
to build a new life in the city, aiming to learn a craft or a trade, which they could do by becoming
an apprentice with a master and later joining the local guild. In the later Middle Ages, the most
popular industries for these skilled townsmen to work in included the food and drink trade,
textiles and cloth, leathercrafts, and metalwork.71 However, it was no easy task to move from
being an unskilled laborer to a guild member. To make the transition, one required skills,
connections, and capital, three things that most immigrating peasants did not have.72 For urban
centers, maintaining the distinction between laborers and skilled workers was crucial for
cultivating and sustaining economic growth and the social status quo, even in the wake of the
Black Death. Yet, even in the face of these strict social and economic structures the city clearly
offered key opportunities for peasants eager to free themselves from the constraints and demands
of agrarian life.
Whether short or long-term, no town provided more of these opportunities than London.
It was the pre-eminent urban center in medieval England, not only because of its size, but also
because of its connection to the royal household and its political power. Even as early as the late
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twelfth century, it was described by William Fitz Stephen as being “one of the most noble and
renowned cities in the worlds; its glory extends farther and its goods and commerce spread
wider, than those of any other city in the realm.”73 By 1300, London was the de facto capital in
England, according to Caroline M. Barron, “in the sense of ‘head town.’”74 Its size allowed it to
develop a highly diversified economy as a center for trade and manufacturing, producing and
shipping goods such as cloths, pewter pots, tin and lead, and agricultural products. This gave
peasants seeking work a wider array of opportunities.75 However, the potential that London
offered did not just attract peasants seeking work, it also attracted well-to dos, craftsmen, and
merchants looking to make their living. These people organized themselves through guilds based
on industry. Each guild consisted of master craftsmen and their employees who joined by paying
a membership fee. For example, York’s tailors’ guild ordained that “apprentices who have
loyally served their masters to the end of their agreed terms shall pay no more than 40d when
they first set up their stalls.”76 The guilds set up rules and regulations to coordinate their
industry’s craftsmen and enforce measures of quality control, while also controlling the market
to protect their members from outside competition.77 When a craftsman became a member of a
guild in London, they were presented to the mayor and aldermen and became official citizens of
the city (often referred to as burgesses). Citizenry provided entry to the political class of the city.
Peasants, unskilled laborers and other townsmen, who were not members of the many guilds,
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made up the bulk of the inhabitants of, but were not citizens of the city and were considered
foreigners, even if they were born there. Thus, only a small minority of London’s inhabitants
(about 7.5 percent) participated in the government and management of the city.78 It was from this
political class that London got its elected officials – the mayor, twenty-four aldermen, and two
sheriffs – who were supported by a growing bureaucratic structure by the later Middle Ages. In
addition to that, there was a legislative assembly, known as the Common Council, which
represented the citizens of the city’s wards in legislative matters and to the king, and later
became particularly influential in financial matters.79 The elites of London used the guilds and
the city government to efficiently regulate the city in a way that allowed them to maintain power
and control over the lower orders of society. This societal structure persisted in the fourteenth
century even through the upheaval caused by the Black Death.
Even though London was self-governing by the fourteenth century, it was not isolated
and still had to operate within the system of England’s royal government, all the more so due to
its close proximity to the royal court regularly held at Westminster. London and the royal
government had a give-and-take relationship to create a balance of power between the two. The
city gained its status as the political capital of the realm because of its proximity to Westminster
and maintained it legal and economic privileges by cooperating with the king, while the Crown
relied on London’s populous for financial and public support. The city complied with the king’s
financial demands because it needed him to ensure its rights to self-governance, which prevented
the Church and nobles from interfering in the city and extracting wealth from it. Through a series
of charters from at least the twelfth century, the city had gained the rights to elect its own sheriffs
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and mayor and have courts and legislative bodies, such as the Common Council, which had to be
renewed with each city charter. The very first of these charters was issued by Henry I in 1133
stated “that those citizens [of London] may choose any sheriff they wish from themselves and
any judge they wish from themselves to take care of pleas of my crown and to decide them; and
let no other judge be over these men of London."80 Over the centuries, this charter was reissued
and additional rights were granted to the city, so that by the mid-fourteenth century London had
the governmental structure laid out above.
While the Crown could theoretically interfere with the city at any time, it only did so
when it did not approve of elected officials or their policies. In general, it was imperative for the
king to retain London’s support in order to maintain order in the royal government and display
his authority to foreign visitors. If there was discord within the royal court, the support of
London’s elites was critical. For example, the support of the Londoners helped Queen Isabella
and her lover, Roger Mortimer, depose King Edward II in 1326. Also, whenever there was a
foreign visitor, a marriage, a birth, or a coronation within the royal household, the people of
London were expected to have impressive celebrations and pageants to impress visitors and
show their support of the Crown. For the same reason, it was also important for the city to appear
clean and peaceful.81
Beyond the political backing London gave the king, there were key financial gains to be
made by the Crown from allowing the city to be self-governing. The same charters that granted
the city its legal privileges also gave it distinct economic privileges. London citizens had the
right to sell their goods in town markets throughout England without being required to pay local
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dues and taxes. And, within the city, only Londoners could trade and sell their goods; all
foreigners and aliens were kept out of the city’s market trade.82 These advantages contributed to
London’s prosperity and made its citizens wealthier. The king regularly needed money to fund
the government, his policies, his wars, and his lifestyle. Throughout most of the thirteenth
century, the king extracted funds from London through tallages (arbitrary royal land taxes on
towns), but in the late part of the century, a system of national taxation was developed. The new
form of direct taxation was established and controlled by Parliament and removed the Crown’s
demands for tallage from London. Even though the king was still taxing the city, the new
method of taxation was preferable to the citizens of London because it was less arbitrary and
required consent from the country’s elites in Parliament. However, even with the income from
taxation, the king still needed more money, so the king looked to London again for his funding,
this time in the form of loans. Because London prospered with its economic privileges, there
were a number of wealthy merchants who obliged him. Edward III was able to secure loans
principally from individual Londoners, but sometimes he took them out from the city
corporately, and those were interest free.83
Even as Edward III extracted money from London, the city received additional economic
opportunities from its relationship with the Crown, both with its trading privileges and ability to
control its own economy through guilds, but also due to its proximity to the royal government.
The convening of Parliament at Westminster, in particular, meant that lords, bishops, and abbots
remained in or near the city for extended periods of time, and thus contributed to the demands
met by the city’s craftsmen and merchants.84 Overall, the relationship between London and the
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Crown was based on the needs of the king and the elites of the city, who cooperated with each
other to meet their needs and create a balance of power; the peasants, whether established or
newly arrived, were expected to play their part when necessary but were otherwise not
considered in the decision-making processes. Just as in the countryside, the urban peasants were
at to the mercy of elites.
When the Black Death came to England, London was, therefore, in a unique position to
handle the fallout because of it established position as a political and economic hub and its
relationship with the Crown. Just as agrarian areas lost large proportions of their population, so
too did London. The city was clearly the largest urban center in medieval England, with its
population peaking in c.1300 at about eighty thousand. By the end of the fourteenth century,
however, its population had shrunk to between forty and fifty thousand. Yet, even taking this
shrinkage into account, the contrast with other urban sites is clear: very few provincial towns in
England reached a population of twenty thousand during the Middle Ages.85 Based on an
analysis of London’s Tax Assessment list for 1346 and the wills registered during and directly
after the period of plague in the city, Barbara E. Megson estimates that the Black Death outbreak
of 1348 to 1349 killed at least thirty-five percent of the well-to-do population of London. This is
an appropriate lower-end estimate for the city, because it is unlikely that mortalities among the
poor would have been any less.86 There were high densities of people living in close quarters in
towns, causing diseases to spread easily through the population, so the poor and the wealthy
were equally exposed to the plague.
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And yet, despite this substantial population loss, London, as we have seen, had the
potential to benefit from the impacts the Black Death had on rural areas. Urban centers were, in
fact, always dependent on immigration to remain prosperous because of high death rates and low
birth rates within cities that persisted even in times of general health and abundance.87 Those
who left rural areas in search of better opportunities due to the constraints of servitude and the
diminishing agricultural production helped repopulate the towns after the Black Death. London,
as the largest urban center, was able to attract people from farther away, with approximately half
of their immigrants in the fourteenth century coming from the area within a forty-mile radius; in
contrast, a smaller town, such as Nottingham, could only attract most of its immigrants from ten
to fifteen miles away.88
Whether established elites or new peasant immigrants in search of a better life, all those
people living in London required food and supplies, which came from the nearby agrarian areas,
and were dependent on the market to obtain them. Some townspeople contributed to their own
food consumption by keeping gardens and raising pigs in the city, but this was nowhere near
enough for them to live on.89 The remainder of the city’s victuals typically came from its
hinterland, which was the area within twenty-two miles of the navigable Thames valley.90 This
was the area in which the cost for transporting grain to the city was still economical, at
approximately six pence per quarter of grain. It was estimated that before the Black Death,
London generated demand for about 165,000 quarters of grains per year, which would require
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137,000 acres to cultivate.91 Based on these calculations and the estimated mortality in London,
the city required around 100,000 quarters of grain per year after the Black Death. According to
Richard Britnell, the largest fifty towns in England accounted for forty-five to sixty-five percent
of grain consumed in towns throughout the country, so while London’s demand was considerable
for any one location, it was only a small proportion of the overall urban food demand. In fact, the
area that London drew its supply from was also responsible for the supply of multiple smaller
urban centers, including Oxford, Guildford, Reading, St. Albans, Rochester, and numerous small
towns and villages.92 We can, therefore, see how the decreased agricultural production in rural
areas, discussed in the preceding sections, would present complications further down the supply
routes as the large population of London continued to need food.
As the largest and most important urban center in the region, London influenced the
hinterland’s market economy. However, despite its size, wealth, and prestige, the city only had a
limited amount of functional control over this hinterland. In contrast to continental European
cities of the time, the only legal power London had to oversee and exploit its hinterland’s
victuals trade came via “The Assizes of Bread, Beer, and Lucrum Pistoris” which allowed it to
regulate the quality of the products that came to and were sold in the city. This assize was a law
that regulated the weight and measure of bread and ale based on the price of grain, as well as the
amount of profit that the baker was allowed to make when selling bread.93 This controlled the
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quality of the most basic food products and made it possible for even the poor to be able to
purchase at least a small amount of bread or ale. The main purpose for such regulations was to
ensure the food supply in London, at the cheapest price possible.94 The Crown’s concern with
regulating quality and prices in London stemmed from its own need to supply the royal
household. There were special rules, regulating the prices and quality of victuals, within the area
known as the verge. Originally the twelve-mile radius around the royal household in which the
those special rules applied, by the time of the Black Death, the Crown had expanded the range of
these regulations.95 Beyond this one ability to enforce quality, the only real control that the city
was able to exert on the hinterland was economic. As the largest market in the region, it had
leverage on the merchants of this area. Despite attempts to keep prices down within the city, the
cost of living in London was higher than in nearby towns because prices were higher there.
Merchants were able to sell their products at a higher price in London, and that appealed to them,
so they continued to sell there. However, London could not guarantee that the merchants would
always return to the city, so they still had to maintain a competitive position in the market.96
Without access to specific legal remedies, London had, in response to previous famines,
developed a network for accessing other supply sources in times of need, such as from other
areas along the east coast of England and even mainland Europe. The city imported food from
these other places when the hinterland was unable to meet the city’s needs or when prices in the
hinterland rose above those of the supplementary supply sources.97 The Crown, intent on
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maintaining London’s stability, aided in this as well by giving licenses to specific merchants to
bring food supplies to London from other areas of the country. For example, the Calendar of the
Patent Rolls tell us that in February 1350, one Geoffrey de Stok was given protection by Edward
III “to buy in the county of Lincoln wheat, malt, oats and other victuals … and bring the same to
London;”98 and in February 1356, a John Lovekyn and a Robert Gosson were both given license
to provide four hundred and one thousand quarters of corn, respectively, from “Barton,
Grymesby and elsewhere on the coast … and bring them to London.”99 In this way, London,
through the king’s personal intervention, was able to maintain the food supply and keep the
prices in the city more stable. In the context of the Black Death, this meant that when the
hinterland failed to produce enough food, London, with aid from the royal government intent on
preserving the strong relationship between the Crown and the city, was able to respond by
utilizing its established supply networks. Westminster’s proximity meant that London was where
the Crown interacted with the common people the most, so the Crown took an interest in
ensuring the city’s food supply. The Crown wanted to provide an open and accessible market
within the city to keep the people content.100 The role of the Crown in post-Black Death urban
economics was, therefore, to issue ad hoc interventions to further the king’s agenda.101
London, with its size, opportunities, and wealth, provided the English peasants fleeing the
countryside with the potential for security and the hope for a better life. Because the systems of
authority were well-established in London by the time of the Black Death, the city was more
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capable of adjusting to the situation. This might make it seem like the impacts of the plague were
smaller on the city than on rural areas, but they were simply different. The city still lost so many
people that they had to dedicate new spaces to burying the dead.102 Their trade routes had to be
adjusted to ensure that the surviving people would not die of starvation; London was one of the
only areas that had the ability to turn to additional sources outside of its regular trade routes for
its supply needs thanks to its market position and relationship with the Crown. These trade routes
were what connected agriculture to the rest of the country and its economy; and were what
connected London and any of the Crown’s economic intrusions with the larger agrarian sector.
The king could interfere in London’s economy easily because he had a long-standing tradition of
doing so.
Yet, even though the Black Death opened up opportunities for peasants to work in the
city, life there could turn out to be just as restrictive as life in the countryside. While not subject
to the constraints of serfdom or labor obligations to landlords, the societal structures of urban
life, which the peasants had work within and around, did not provide them with access to power
or to social mobility; that was saved for those who had skills and could afford it. The guilds and
the system of citizenship kept the peasants securely outside the systems of authority established
by the local elites and the royal government. London was key to the prosperity of the Crown, so
the king had to ensure its survival, which he did through his interventions. This glimpse into
urban life exemplifies how consensus between the elites and the king functions to limit the role
of peasants in society; a relationship that is evident not just within the city of London, but
throughout the countryside as well.
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Meddling in the Post-Black Death Economy and Government
The aftermath of the plague presented the peasants with opportunities to improve their
lives by moving to the city and finding better paying work with less restrictions and obligations
attached to the position. In the countryside, the possibility for an increase in peasant wages in the
wake of the Black Death offered another chance for social mobility. Peasants had endured low
wages and harsh working conditions throughout the first half of the fourteenth century due to
high population rates and competition for work.103 So, when they were presented with a chance
to improve their conditions, they took it. In the immediate aftermath of the Black Death, peasants
leveraged their newfound opportunities and the increased demand for their labor to get higher
wages and better working conditions. However, as we will discuss below, this rise in peasant
influence was only short term. Just as in London, elites in the countryside worked to minimize
the increased status of peasants in an effort to maintain the status quo as it had been for
generations.
As noted above, the mass mortality generated a higher demand for labor, providing
workers with more opportunities to choose from. In order to retain workers, employers had to
pay more, and thus, peasants were able to secure higher wages. This was especially significant in
agrarian areas because the lords needed tenants and laborers to work their demesne land. Without
enough tenants and laborers, not all the land would be worked and that which was worked would
not have been taken care of at the same level as before the plague.104 This meant that the food
supply would not only decrease the first year after the Black Death, but continue to be
diminished in subsequent years, because the pre-plague levels of production were not
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recovered.105 But even beyond this concern for subsistence, the landowners’ were worried about
the financial impacts the plague would have on their estates. They lost out on revenue from both
rents and the sale of crops from their own demesne lands due to the mortality of many of their
tenants and the subsequent fall in agricultural production. According to an inquiry undertaken by
the exchequer, for example, the Bishop of Worcester lost “£84 4s ½d … because of the lack of
tenants who used to pay the rent and of customary tenants who used to perform the labor
services” in the immediate aftermath of the plague.106 This was a loss of nearly seventy percent
of the income expected on that land (“£123 16s 2d”);107 and that sum of just over £84 was the
equivalent to at least 4210 days, or about 11½ years, of wages for a skilled tradesman.108 When
landowners then needed to pay more for labor, their income decreased even more.
English elites were clearly displeased about having to pay their laborers more. The
chronicler in Rochester noted that “such a shortage of workers ensued that the humble turned up
their noses at employment, and could scarcely be persuaded to serve the eminent unless for triple
wages.”109 This chronicler, one William de la Dene, a monk and member of the wealthy
Cathedral Priory of Rochester, clearly writes from the perspective of the elites. The lowest in
society, or the “humble,” were expected to take whatever opportunities were offered to them by
those higher in society, or the “eminent,” because it was what they had been doing for
generations. This division was, in fact, the bedrock principle of medieval society, which as Marc
Bloch describes it, was “divided into three ‘orders’: those who prayed, those who fought, and
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those who worked.”110 Elites saw the peasant’s demands for higher wages as an affront to this
established order of society; from their viewpoint, the peasants were being greedy by trying to
get more out of life than their position in society allowed for. Peasants saw the post-Black Death
situation as a time to hope for a better life as more opportunities presented themselves. And so,
they were able to do something new and make demands of the landholders which, if met, would
have improved their standards of living. These changes in peasant attitudes towards the elites
caused the landowners significant financial losses. Moreover, the economic changes in the wake
of the Black Death also had the potential to result in a loss of social status for the elites and even
the potential for complete societal upheaval. If the peasants could increase their standing in
society, the difference between them and the elites would shrink, thereby diminishing the
importance and power that the elites held in society. 111 Landowners, concerned with their own
well-being in the post-Black Death economy and society, implored the king to help them
maintain their status.
And Edward III did help the nobles. It is this move by elites and subsequently by the king
to prevent a disruption of social hierarchy that can help us to understand the key conundrum
regarding wages in the period after the Black Death that is at the heart of this thesis. Despite the
peasants leveraging their newfound power to get higher wages and opportunities for social
mobility, the aftermath of the Black Death was not the beginning of a new social order. Wages
rose for peasants, but only for a couple of years; then they remained stagnant for two decades.112
In 1347, the wages for mowing and reaping wheat were 5d and 5¾d per acre, respectively; the
wages for the same work in 1350 were 11d and 7¾d per acre. However, in 1352 the wages for
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mowing and reaping wheat were 6¼d and 6½d per acre, respectively; and those wages fluctuated
very little until 1371, when the wages for that work was 8d and 11d.113 What caused wages to
stagnate this way when their rising seems so natural after the plague? Christopher Dyer, one of
the foremost scholars in economic and social history of medieval England, offers a few potential
explanations for this: perhaps, he argues, previously unemployed people filled the gaps left in the
labor market after the Black Death. But this is unlikely because wages were not at rock-bottom
prior to 1348; alternatively, he suggests that “social and institutional restraints” worked to keep
the wages down.114 I’d argue that this is far more likely to be the case, with the institutional
restraints that Dyer refers to being the Crown’s interventions in the labor economy to stop the
rising wages after the plague. Edward III meddled with the English economy by introducing new
regulations that disrupted the natural course of the impacts of the Black Death. He did this in
order to maintain the established social order, which was upset when the peasantry gained more
influence in society after the mass mortality caused by the pestilence. The king was concerned
with the lives of nobles and how they affected his own standing in society and his ability to
govern; he was far less concerned with the lives of peasants. Edward III based his post-Black
Death management of English government and economy on these priorities. And so, though
rising wages should have been an expected repercussion of the mass mortality, rather than a
boost in their livelihood, peasants quickly found themselves repressed once more by the upper
echelons of English society.
Intent on maintaining their finances and social status, the nobility wasted no time taking
their concerns about peasant wages to king, and he wasted no time drafting a response to the
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problem. In 1349, as the plague still ravaged England, the Crown issued the “Ordinance of
Laborers,” which ordered that “workers take only the wages, livery, meed, or salary, which were
accustomed to be given in the places where he oweth to serve, the twentieth year of our reign of
England, or five or six other commone years next before [sic]."115 This law was an attempt to
reverse the rise in wages and return them to what they were prior to the Black Death. However,
most of the country did not abide by this ordinance and wages continued to rise. In another
attempt to force wages down, the Crown issued the “Statute of Laborers” in 1351.116 This law
was written to reiterate and enforce the “Ordinance of Laborers.” The “Ordinance,” in 1349, had
relied on local and private enforcement, but the punishments of fines and jail times were not
implemented effectively or consistently enough to thoroughly coerce peasants into accepting the
lower wages.117 As indicated by the issuance of a second rendition of the law, the widespread
disobedience was noticed by the Crown and rising peasant wages continued to be a problem. The
“Statute of Laborers” goes further than the “Ordinance” in that it specifies enforcement
measures:
“the said stewards, bailiffs and constables of the said towns be sworn before the same
justices that they will inquire diligently … about all those who act contrary to the
ordinance, and that they will certify their names to the justices whenever they come into
the area to hold their sessions, so that the said justices, having received the names of such
rebels from the stewards, bailiffs and constables, may have them arrested to appear
before the justices and answer for their offences, so that they may make a fine and
ransom to the king if they are convicted, and over that let them be sent to prison, there to
remain until they find surety that they will take employment and wages, and carry out
their work … in the manner specified.”118
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This meant that the local authorities would track the local peasants to ensure that they were
obeying this law. Then, when the justices, specifically chosen by the king to enforce this law,
came to the area, the local authorities would tell them which peasants were not obeying the law
and they would be arrested and tried before the justices. This was a novel addition to the powers
granted to local authorities and alike, as they were now tasked with seeking out offenders and
punishing them, where they had previously only settled disputes that were brought to them.119
The enforcement of the “Statute of Laborers” resulted in workers having to swear twice a year,
in front of local officials, to obey the law and if they refused, they would be fined or put in jail
until they agreed, which gave local officials more extensive authority over the local laborers.120 It
also established a greater system of cooperation between the royal government and local
authorities, because they now had a task that required them to work with each other, rather than
in opposition to each other. Because the power granted to them in the “Statute of Laborers” came
directly from the king, the local officials now gained more authority; in a way, local official
became agents of national authority after the Black Death. In turn, the king gained more access
to local networks of power, heightening his own central authority.121 With the “Statute of
Laborers,” the king, with the cooperation of local authorities, was able to effectively suppress
peasants wages, not just in the immediate aftermath of the plague, but for the next two decades.
As we have seen, the effects of the plague disrupted English society at a fundamental
level. Peasants found a way to exert more influence in society than they ever had before, which
undermined the system of oppression based on status that had been in place for generations. In
order to prevent this trend of increase peasant power from solidifying in English society, Edward
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III took active measures to maintain the status quo and appease his noble landholders. But, why
did he do this? Why reissue failed laws in the face of a defiant labor force? Why were local elites
willing to give the king additional power? Why was he willing to help entrench the local elites?
What did Edward III gain from doing this?
In our earlier discussion of London, we saw how the Crown and the city elites had
formed a balance of power so that they could both fulfill their needs while also supporting each
other. A similar balancing act took place between the Crown and the nobility of the countryside.
In the wake of the Black Death, the nobles needed the king to help them maintain their estates,
because their power and wealth was being threatened. The king placated them with the new laws
regulating labor because he needed the support of the nobles in order to implement his political
agenda. In the middle of the fourteenth century, that agenda primarily included an attempt to
more fully control England’s economy and to defend and expand his holdings on the continent
via war with France, both of which were a part of his central goal of maintaining and increasing
his royal power. Neither the elites nor the king could accomplish their goals without the support
of the other. Through a system of accommodations, the ruling classes of English society, king
and nobles alike, were able to implement processes that maintained the status quo, even in the
wake of the disaster brought about by the Black Death.
The ruling elites of England hoped to maintain their wealth, power, and status in society
by inviting greater royal control into their economic affairs. At its core, these elites can be
divided into two categories: the nobles and the gentry. The nobles were those who were granted
land and titles by the king. The highest among them were the earls, who worked closely with the
king and were often his friends, family members, and confidants. Below them were the various
barons, who were distinguished from the earls by the size of their landholdings, their wealth, and
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their status – they were not as close to king, though they still had considerable authority. When it
came to politics, the nobles were those who made up the House of Lords in Parliament and had
the most direct access to the king. By the end of the fourteenth century, there were about seventy
noble families in England.122 The gentry, then, sat below the nobles, in terms of social hierarchy.
They consisted of all the landowners below barons but above yeomen (those peasants who
owned their own farms and thus did not owe rent or labor on other men’s land); even the lowest
gentry would have typically owned enough land to have tenants. Each county throughout
England typically had between fifty and seventy gentry families, from which the local officials,
such as sheriffs, justices, and members of the House of Commons of Parliament, were chosen.123
From local officials to the whole of Parliament, the nobility and the gentry comprised the entirety
of the English political community. They not only excluded the peasants from the decisionmaking processes but maintained their own power and wealth by profiting off of their labor.
As we have discussed, the demographic changes in the wake of the plague threatened to
upset the established societal structure, which the nobles and gentry were used to controlling. It
made sense for them to cooperate with the king’s policies to control of the situation, because
they received their authority from the king and thus believed in his power to preserve it. The
nobles, especially, were chosen by the king to hold a greater amount of power. In 1337, Edward
III appointed an almost entirely new group of earls by filling posts that were left vacant due to
the deaths of the previous earls and by creating six new earldoms.124 With these appointments
often came money and land. For example, Henry of Grosmont was named earl of Derby and was
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given both the lands typically associated with that title and “1000 marks yearly out of the king’s
customs.”125 For both the nobles and the gentry, the political power granted to them by the king
was key to their cooperation with him. Having a seat in Parliament gave them a say in the
national government. It was in Parliament that laws were made. A common issue could be
presented to them and then they would take it to the king; a statute would be written depending
on the king’s response, but it also had to have the assent of both the House of Lords and the
House of Commons, the two branches of elite landholders, to become an official law. Parliament
was also responsible for approving all direct taxations that the king requested.126 The monarchy
gave the elites of Parliament the power to approve taxes because direct taxation was an easier
method of raising funds than holding them accountable to feudal obligations, similar to how it
was easier for the king to tax the citizens of London than extract tallages from them.127 By doing
this the Crown traded some of its power over the elites in order to collect more money from the
realm in a simpler way. However, it did mean that if the king requested taxes too often or at too
high of a rate, Parliament could refuse him. An early example of this is from 1297, when Edward
I demanded a heavy tax, the earls refused him and blocked the collection of the funds until he
was willing to confirm the charters of their land grants. Through this, we can see the give-andtake between the Crown and elites: the charters needed the king’s approval to be legal documents
and the earls held the purse strings.128 During the first half of the fourteenth century, the overall
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power of the elites continued to grow as they became more central to the governing of England.
It was the maintenance and growth of their wealth and power that was the fundamental concern
for the nobles and gentry.129 Because these largely came from the Crown via grants of titles,
land, and opportunities for prestige, the elites were willing to cooperate with the king in order to
ensure that they protected their power and place within the social order.
While it may seem as though the king was giving a lot of power without receiving much
in return, that is not the case. By working with the nobles, Edward III gained support for his
policies, funds from taxes, and increased central power. By the mid-fourteenth century, the elites
throughout the country had essentially become an extension of the king’s governance; this can be
seen throughout the Calendars of the Patent Rolls when the king chose members of the gentry
and nobility to carry out his directives, such as purchasing food and bringing it to London,
collecting funds and supplies for the ongoing war, and overseeing the implementation of
legislation and justice. But, all of this came with strings attached. Each decision Edward III made
in regard to his elites was politically calculated. By the mid-fourteenth the English Crown could
do very little without the support of the elites because the established system required consensus
amongst those in power; kings who did not acknowledge this found themselves in political
crises. Perhaps the best example of this is when King John lost the support of his barons by
asking too much from them and was forced to sign the Magna Carta in 1215.130 Edward III
understood this when he appointed his new nobility in 1337. He chose people for those positions
that he specifically believed would understand his decisions and be loyal to him throughout his
reign.131 The nobles and gentry needed to feel important to the king and to the governance of the
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country. Edward III gave this to them by granting them the authorities that were so important to
them. As long as he could keep them satisfied with their positions in society, he knew that he
would have their support. If he did not, or if he pushed too hard against their power and
privileges, he knew that they would turn against him. He had become king at the young age of
fourteen, because the elites turned against his father, Edward II, in a coup led by the powerful
baron Roger Mortimer and Queen Isabella. Edward II had favorite nobles to whom he granted
immense power and privileges, which combined with poor economic decisions and military
failure led the rest of the elites, in the countryside as well as in the city of London, to turn against
him and support his deposers.132 The first three years of Edward III’s reign were then ruled by
his mother as regent with Mortimer as her main advisor. It was only after Edward III staged his
own coup in 1330 that he took control of the government.133
Throughout his reign, therefore, Edward III worked consistently to retain the broad
support of England’s elites and to avoid the fate of his father. In the wake of the Black Death,
this was no different. The elites were displeased with the increased influence that the peasants
attempted to take hold of, because it could have meant their societal downfall, which could have,
in turn, led to the end of Edward III’s reign if he did not address the situation. So, Edward III
implemented policies, such as the “Ordinance” and “Statute of Laborers” to reinforce the societal
status quo. If, in the quest for maintenance of the established social order, elites sought to retain
their power and authority, Edward III, in turn, sought to retain support for his policies; each side
gained what was most important to them; the implications of which can be seen in his tactics to
more fully control England’s economy and to defend and expand his holdings on the continent
via war with France, both of which fundamentally depended on elite support.
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As we have seen, the immediate economic effects of the Black Death, such as the rising
wages of laborers, the decreased agricultural production, and the reduction of rent income
resulted in an overall loss of profits for landholders. The “Ordinance” and “Statute of Laborers”
were both efforts to counteract these effects, because, as noted by W.M. Ormrod, the king was
concerned with recreating “the economic conditions that had prevailed before the plague.”134 In
the decade prior to the plague, the king and the elites had managed an economic systems that
brought them prosperity; they cooperated to ensure both their needs were met in terms of power
and wealth for the nobles and gentry and adequate elite backing for the king.135 When, after the
Black Death, the peasants began to push against the established system, it upset not only the
elites, but the king as well. In fact, the Calendar of the Patent Rolls mentions the king
“resist[ing] the sloth and malice of servants who when others died in the pestilence seeing the
necessity of their lords would not serve them unless they received excessive stipends.”136 This
parallels the sentiment of the nobility that the Rochester chronicler captured when writing about
the peasants seeking higher wages.137 Peasants were viewed by the Crown, nobles, and gentry
alike as being selfish because they refused to continue working for the same low wages as before
the plague, because they were going against the system that the elites had built to benefit
themselves. Maintenance of the status quo in agrarian areas mattered to the king, not only in
order to appease the elites, but also because he was a landholder himself, and was therefore,
directly impacted by the peasant demands for higher wages. He was, in fact, the largest
landholder in the realm. Technically, the monarchy owned all the land in England since the
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Norman Conquest, but that was not a feasible system to operate under. It was during the reign of
Henry II that they system for managing the Crown’s estate that Edward III used was established.
The king would grant pieces of the royal estate through tenurial arrangements to royal servants
whom he wished to elevate in status, such as when he appointed new earls. By the midfourteenth century, the most important grants of the royal estate were to endow other members of
the royal family, so the majority of those lands were still connected to the king. Because of just
how much land the king owned, even with such grants, he still had the largest demesne in the
realm.138 Therefore, the economic issues created in the aftermath of the Black Death were of
concern to Edward III both because he had to keep his elites satisfied with their economic status
and wealth and because it directly impact the management of his own lands and familial lands
which reflected his own status, power, and wealth in the country.
The king’s efforts to institute greater economic controls also extended to the control of
prices. Beyond any ideological element, Edward III might have noticed that higher wages often
meant higher prices and, therefore, believed that artificially lowering the wages would also lower
the prices of foodstuffs. Knighton recorded in 1349 that “the necessities of life became so dear,
that what in previous times was worth 1d. now cost 4d. or 5d."139 This inflation was yet another
economic consequence of the Black Death. We have seen how the spread of the plague
decreased agricultural production, which in turn caused the food supply to be diminished below
the necessary levels to sustain the population. Price inflation, therefore, seems like a natural
response to having less supply than demand; however, medieval England did not function with
the theories of a modern market-based economy. It functioned with the medieval economic
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concept of balance: stable wages and prices meant that the system was working as the elites had
built it to. Rising wages and rising prices in the wake of the Black Death signaled a substantial
disruption to the established economic system. Because economics and politics were inseparable,
Edward III felt the need to use his economic power, which was theoretically absolute, to control
both wages and prices in order to reestablish balance within the economy.140 One of the king’s
attempts to lower prices was the issuance of two statutes in 1351, the “Free Trade Statute” and
the “Statute of Forestallers.”141 Combined, these two laws protected free trade without
interference and punished anyone who forestalled (buying victuals before they reached the
market with the intention of reselling them later at a higher price).142 Edward III’s goal with
these was to decrease the prices of foodstuffs.143 That, however, did not take place. Grain prices
remained high for years after the issuance of these laws. From the early 1340s to the early 1370s,
the prices for grain rose by forty-three percent. When wages were on the rise, the rise in prices
would have meant that the real wages were about the same as prior to the Black Death.144
Instead, because wages were forced down by the Crown, the real wages actually decreased,
leaving the peasants worse off than were before the plague. These policies were not successful in
driving down prices as Edward III had intended, which meant that he would have to find other
ways to control the economy. However, the success of the labor regulations balanced out this
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failure and gave the king and the elites enough control over the economy to placate their needs
for power over the peasants for decades to come.
But it was not just out of a concern for the maintenance of the social structure that
Edward III tried to control the economy, he also had another specific economic agenda tied to his
political agenda: the Hundred Years’ War. By the time the plague arrived in 1348, Edward III
and Philip VI, king of France, had been at war for just over ten years, only the beginning of what
would be a century-long ordeal. Since the middle of the thirteenth century, a series of French
kings had slowly but relentlessly seized continental lands that were traditionally held by the
kings of England who just so happened to also be noble lords in France. Adding to this was the
dispute over the French throne: Edward III had a strong claim to it when his uncle, Charles IV
died with no direct heirs, but the French chose Philip of Valois as his successor instead. Tensions
between the two countries came to a head in 1337 when Philip VI seized Aquitaine, property of
the kings of England in their role as dukes since the twelfth century, and in retaliation Edward III
declared himself king of France.145 For the remainder of his reign, the war would be a key
priority for Edward III.
Edward III quickly learned that making war is expensive. Throughout the war, the
English had troops on the continent in Gascony, their last major crown holding on the continent,
and in Calais, which they captured in 1347.146 Those troops required routine supplies in order to
keep the war effort going. Calais and Gascony were both heavily dependent on England for
victuals, which the Crown had to pay for.147 Even though the royal government paid less than the
market price, the prices were still, to some extent, regulated by the market. Therefore, the king
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was concerned with changes in the market.148 The rising prices after the Black Death meant that
the royal government would have to pay more for the supplies needed for the military. Thus,
Edward III’s efforts to diminish wages was based on a desire to reduce grain prices, not just
because he was worried about having to pay more at home, but because he was worried about
having to pay more for victuals in order to supply the military efforts of the Hundred Years’
War.
The two main ways by which the Crown raised supplies were purveyance and taxation.
Purveyance was when officers of the central government would go to a county, as specified by
the king, to purchase a designated amount of victuals for lower than the market price, and the
counties were required to provide these supplies.149 The king would regularly issue purveyances
to supply the war effort. For example, in January 1347 the king issued a “licence [sic] for
Bernard … to take from the port of Sandwich 700 quarters of wheat … to Gascony for the
sustenance of [the] men there in the king’s service.”150 Taxation, on the other hand, was the
principal way in which the Crown made money. The lay subsidy was the tax levied to finance the
war; it was not levied every year, but once the Hundred Years’ War began, it became a
considerable burden for the peasantry.151 However, Edward III would not have been able to fund
his war in this way without the support of England’s elites. Taxes could not be levied without the
approval of the nobles and gentry in Parliament and he needed local officials to collect the
victuals ordered in each purveyance.152
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The English elites supported the king’s war with France and allowed the burdensome
taxations and purveyances to fund it, because participation in the war helped them achieve their
fundamental goal of maintaining and growing their wealth and power. In order to wage war, the
king needed soldiers and military leadership. The nobles and gentry were crucial both for the
skills as soldier and their role in raising and leading troops from across England. By the midfourteenth century, the king and elites could no longer require their tenants to serve in the
military based on feudal obligations, instead, they had to convince them to join in other ways.
The gentry were pivotal to the recruitment of foot soldiers for the war because they were both in
positions of authority and had access to the masses; the recruiting agents would emphasize the
pay and potential for materials rewards from fighting to convince men to enlist voluntarily.153
The nobles and gentry themselves, participated in the war in positions of leadership. Those in
higher positions of social standing typically had higher ranks in the military, but the war also
presented opportunity for advancement. If a knight or lesser noble performed well in the war,
their social status could be elevated from the prestige and material goods won in the war. 154 One
of the best examples of how knights’ earned prestige is with the creation of the Order of the
Garter. In 1349, amidst the chaos of the plague, Edward III formed the Order of the Garter
“made up of himself and his sons and the bravest and noblest in England,” as Jean Froissart, an
important chronicler of the Hundred Year’s War, explained it.155 Twenty-four knights were
chosen as the founding members of the Order, all of whom contributed to England’s military
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victory against the French at Crécy in 1346. Membership in a chivalric order provided incredible
prestige and glory to a knight, not least of all, proximity to the king himself, which is what all
elites sought when fighting in war.156 The elites’ monetary gains of war came mainly from
significant booties and ransoms, because they were not paid salaries the way foot soldiers were.
Because of the ample possibilities to increase one’s social standing through fighting, war became
the principal activity for many elites during Edward III’s reign. It was important to them to take
any opportunity that they could to increase their authority and wealth, because the more powerful
they were, the more secure their position was in society for themselves and their children.157 It
was the promise of glory, prestige, and profits for both the king and the elites that guaranteed
their cooperation throughout the war.
The Black Death and its mass mortality, however, nearly stopped the war; military
activity paused from 1348 to 1355.158 Nonetheless, the troops in Gascony and Calais remained,
and continued to need supplies from England. As we have seen, after the plague, agriculture
production in England diminished dramatically and that impacted the Crown’s ability to collect
victuals. For example, in July 1350 the king appointed “Roger Larcher to purvey 1000 quarters
of wheat, 500 quarters of oats, 200 carcasses of [beefs] and 200 bacon pigs in the counties of
Southampton and Wilts … to bring the same to Gascony for the king’s lieges there,” however,
the order was “vacated and nothing was done thereof.”159 Roger Larcher was unable to complete
the purveyance because of the food supply shortage that began in the wake of the Black Death.
This, however, did not dissuade Edward III from continuing purveyance efforts. In early October
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1350, “Nicholas Lambe [was appointed] to purvey 40 quarters of wheat, 80 quarters of oats and
20 cartloads of hay, in the counties of Southampton and Wilts, for the passage to Gascony.”160
There is a stark contrast in the amount of supplies required between these two purveyances. Such
a difference is due to the king being made aware of the hardships caused by the Black Death and
having to lower his expectations. The elites responsible for collecting the first purveyance would
have made it clear to him that victuals in that amount could not have been provided without
causing undue hardship on the local peasants and the elites themselves. In other words, the elites
could not support the larger purveyance requirement, so the king lowered his demands, because
getting less supplies with the support of the elites was better than getting no supplies with the
elites against him.
Edward III, however, could have stopped purveyances altogether, allowing his people to
keep their food supplies and recover after the Black Death faster. That he did not do this
indicates that the war with France was a greater priority than any concerns over domestic
welfare. For the king, the fight against the French kings was a part of a larger effort to maintain
and elevate his social standing. The French monarchy was seen as the aggressor, attempting to
take what was rightfully Edward III’s through his lineage.161 We can see just how important it
was by the fact that he denied the chance to become the Holy Roman Emperor, “saying that he
would rather seek his rights” to the lands and throne in France.162 Additionally, throughout the
more general sources from the period we can see how the war had become a fundamental
component of Edward III’s reign. In Knighton’s Chronicle, the pages before and after his
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discussion of the Black Death are about the ongoing war.163 And, even amidst his points about
the plague, Knighton comes back to the war. For example, after telling of deaths in Avignon, he
states that “in the mean time the commons of Flanders … gained Bruges by deceit, and beheaded
and hanged those Flemings whom … supported the king of England.” Then, “King Edward
assembled his army.”164 By the time the plague arrived, the war was, in fact, a part of the status
quo. And, therefore, it was expected that it would continue. The king had invested most of his
political clout into the continuation of the war and was not going to give it up simply because the
Black Death caused delays. The elites, also, continued to need the war to support their insatiable
desire for power and wealth. However, they were unable to do this unless they continued to
control the peasantry; if the peasants did not continue their agricultural work as they had before
the plague, society would lose its basic functionality, and the elites, therefore, would be unable to
pursue their higher goals.
All of this shows us that the Crown’s intervention in the post-Black Death economy and
government was a tactic to further the king’s own agenda. Edward III meddled with prices and
wages to repress the peasantry and retain the nobles’ support both for the Hundred Years’ War
and more broadly. By doing this, the Crown prevented the natural economic responses to the
Black Death. We can therefore see how the peasantry was connected to elites and the Crown in
the Middle Ages. Without peasants doing their work in the lower parts of society, the upper
echelons of society could not function as they were used to. The king and elites had a system in
place that allowed them both to pursue their goals without encroaching upon each other. The
Black Death, and its impacts on peasants, disrupted that system. The economic regulations put in
place by Edward III in the wake of the plague were intended to continue the repression of the
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peasants, so that the elites and the king could maintain their status quo and their pursuit for
power, prestige, and wealth.

Conclusion
The Black Death occurred in the middle of a tumultuous century and only added to the
chaos. The disease itself killed at least a third of the population in England, which had dramatic
effects on the society and economy. As we’ve seen, one of the most significant impacts of the
plague was how it disrupted agriculture production and by extension the lives of peasants. The
mass mortality led to lower rates of productivity, which in turn, led to lower crop yields, causing
a shortage of foodstuffs. Despite this added hardship, the peasants that survived the pestilence
were presented with the potential to improve their lives. They initially had new opportunities
with their tenancies and for better work conditions; the number of peasants working as villeins
decreased; and, with the possibility for higher wages, they were economically better off.
This was not to be. The king and elites, displeased with the changes in the peasantry’s
status, worked to counteract their gains in order to preserve the status quo from before the Black
Death. Edward III meddled with the economy by regulating prices and wages, which halted the
peasants’ advancements. This was all in an effort to maintain the established social order with
the king and elites’ working relationship which allowed them each to pursue power and prestige,
all the while, controlling and limiting the peasants. The natural ramifications of the Black Death,
therefore, were not able to play out in the ways that we would have expected them to. When
there is a struggle between natural economics and governmental policies, the Crown wins to the
detriment of the peasants.
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By the mid-1350s, England probably thought that they were done with the plague and its
impacts, but unbeknownst to them, they would face three more outbreaks before the century was
over. The brief taste of power that the peasants got after the Black Death would not be forgotten,
and neither would the policies implemented to repress them. When writing of the impacts of the
“Statute of Laborers,” Knighton noted that it meant that wage-earning peasants “served their
masters worse than ever before.”165 Moreover, the ramifications of the first outbreak would
continue to reverberate for decades to come. The “Statute of Laborers” would be enforced
throughout the second half of the fourteenth century. This set the stage for the growth of state’s
ability to legislate and intervene in the lives of peasants. For example, in 1388 legislation was
passed that restricted peasants’ movements. These, combined with other encroachments on
peasants’ lives, contributed to pushbacks against the status quo of the elites. The most notable of
these would be the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt, the culmination of grievances that had their origins in
the aftermath of the 1348 outbreak of the plague.
In studying the aftermath of the Black Death, we can see the way that the various systems
that make up a society interact. Nothing happens in isolation. One person, or one place, or one
event is always connected to countless other pieces of society. This is how the impacts of the
plague on grain production could be connected to the king passing labor regulation, which was,
in turn, connected to a personal political war across the Channel. Peasants, gentry, nobles, and
royalty were all linked together when the Black Death devastated England, and when one of
them sought to change their position in society, all the others were impacted and had to react.
The complex intertwining of society can seem simple in a time of stability, but its true colors
come out during crises.

165

Knighton, 121.

54

Crises, such as the Black Death, expose the elements of a society that impact and inform
governments’ decisions. It all comes down to who has the power and what their priorities are. As
we have seen, in fourteenth-century England, the king, the nobles, and the gentry held the power;
peasants, while the base of society, had no palpable authority. This meant that despite their slight
gains immediately after the plague, the peasants were always at the mercy of the elites. It was the
elites’ perpetual quest for power, prestige, and wealth that guided the implementation of the new
economic regulations. Very little concern was ever given to the peasants and their livelihoods.
And so, peasants continued to be held down by the powerful elites, even though the crisis could
have been a time of change.
When we look at the Black Death today it is hard not to draw parallels with our own
crises. We can use this study of the plague and its impacts on society to analyze the predicament
that faces our world now. The current coronavirus pandemic is one of only a few pandemics that
have occurred in the past seven hundred years since the Black Death. Governments around the
world are attempting to manage the impacts of the disease and are already facing the economic
and political consequences. Just like in the fourteenth century, the way forward will be
determined by the complex interchange of power that drives our modern world.
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